The Millennium Development Goal Aid Targets, and the Costs of Over-Expectations by Clemens, Michael A. et al.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 6
Issue 1 Fall 2005: Development Goals & Indicators Article 19
The Millennium Development Goal Aid Targets,




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clemens, Michael A., Charles J. Kenny, and Todd J. Moss. "The Millennium Development Goal Aid Targets, and the Costs of Over-
Expectations." Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Fall 2005, 58-65, 84.
58FALL 2005 
INTRODUCTION
In September 2000 at the United Nations, 147 presidents,prime ministers, and monarchs—the largest-ever gatheringof heads of state—unanimously adopted the Millennium
Declaration, committing themselves to a series of international
development objectives to be reached by 2015.1 Known since
2001 as the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), these
eight goals are widely cited as the primary yardstick against
which advances in international development efforts are to be
judged.2 The official MDG website says that the goals “have
been commonly accepted as a framework for measuring devel-
opment progress.”3
After the MDGs were established, a priority became calcu-
lating what kinds of resources and actions would be necessary
to reach them. There are now several “costing” studies, estimat-
ing how much money would be required to reach the goals. In
addition to other conditions, such as higher economic growth
and the improved economic policies, these studies have con-
cluded that something in the range of $40-70 billion in extra
resources each year will be necessary. Fifty billion dollars is the
most commonly cited figure for new annual aid requirements. 
Nearly five years after establishing the MDGs, it appears
that the global goal of halving poverty may soon be reached
because of rapid progress by the two population giants of India
and China.4 However, it appears almost certain that the majority
of developing countries will not meet the country-level poverty
targets set by the Millennium Declaration, nor many of the other
goals. Of the 47 African countries, 42 are considered “off track”
for at least half of the targets and twelve are “off track” for all tar-
gets. Meeting the goals for the majority of country indicators
would require more than doubling the rate of progress.5 For
instance, Barbara Bruns, Alain Mingat, and Ramahatra
Rakotomalala estimate that 86 out of 155 countries are at risk of
not achieving the goal of universal primary education.6 Twenty-
seven of these countries are not even expected to break the fifty
percent completion threshold by 2015. These forecasts exclude
the sixteen developing countries with no data—all of which are
likely to have extremely low indicators. In the 2003 Human
Development Report, the United Nations Development
Programme estimates that, on current rates of progress, sub-
Saharan Africa would not meet the hunger, primary education,
and child mortality targets for at least another century.7
This apparently bleak state of affairs is already leading to
complaints that the rich countries are not living up to their end
of the MDG bargain.8 The eighth goal commits rich countries to
a global partnership for development, wherein they promise to
allow greater trade access, reduce debts, and increase aid.
Although there has been substantial progress in debt reduction,
rich country trade policies have not significantly changed to be
more favorable to developing countries, notably on agricultural
market reform. Furthermore, the estimated levels of mobilized
resources required have not been forthcoming from donors.
Official development assistance (“ODA”) from the main interna-
tional donors9 totaled $53 billion in 1999, and this figure rose to
just $57 billion in 2002 and $79 billion in 2004, far from the dou-
bling of aid called for by a range of costing studies. If many of the
MDG targets are formally missed in 2015, will we be able to point
to the failure of donors to provide resources as the main culprit? 
This article discusses the links in the chain of causality
between increased aid flows and attaining the MDGs, and sug-
gests that, due to several caveats, the MDGs are unlikely to be
reached regardless of new aid flows. The article examines sev-
eral specific goals to highlight some of these issues. In each
case, it appears that there are limits on the role for increased
financing to accelerate trends, and many countries are very like-
ly to miss the MDG targets, regardless of rapid progress. There
may, in fact, be costs to over-expectations and the manufacture
of “failures” to meet the MDGs.
HOW THE MDGS HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED
From the beginning, the MDGs were interpreted as the need
for greater donor financing.10 The 1990 OECD DAC develop-
ment policy review, which gave birth to the MDGs, stated blunt-
ly, “Development costs money . . . the high-income countries
need to supply more aid.”11 The United Nation’s Monterrey
Consensus proclaimed that “a substantial increase in [ODA] and
other resources will be required if developing countries are to
achieve the internationally agreed development goals.”12
THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 
AID TARGETS, AND THE COSTS OF
OVER-EXPECTATIONS
by Michael A. Clemens, Charles J. Kenny, and Todd J. Moss*
* Michael Clemens (mclemens@cgdev.org) and Todd Moss
(tmoss@cgdev.org) are Research Fellows at the Center for Global
Development. Charles Kenny (ckenny@worldbank.org) is a Senior Economist
at the World Bank. The authors thank Alicia Bannon for excellent research
assistance, and Colin Bradford, Bill Cline, Kim Elliot, Maureen Lewis, Steve
Radelet, David Roodman, Markus Scheuermaier, Peter Timmer, Kelly Tobin,
Jeremy Weinstein, and John Williamson for helpful comments on an earlier
draft. All judgments, opinions, and errors are those of the authors alone and
do not represent the views of the Center for Global Development, the World
Bank, or either of their respective staffs or boards of directors, nor the coun-
tries that the Executive Directors of the World Bank represent. A longer ver-
sion of this article is available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/
detail/2749.
59
Several efforts have been made to estimate the cost to
achieve the MDGs. A 2001 study led by former Mexican
President Ernesto Zedillo and known as the “High-level Panel
on Financing for Development”13 estimated that reaching the
MDGs would require an additional $50 billion per year in ODA,
plus three billion dollars more in humanitarian aid, and about
fifteen billion dollars more for “global public goods.” This
brings the total of additional resources to at least $68 billion, or
slightly more than double the current levels of aid. A second
widely cited study by Shantayanan Devarajan, Margaret J.
Miller, and Eric V. Swanson of the World Bank uses two esti-
mates for costing the MDGs.14 First, it calculates the additional
resources necessary to increase economic growth so as to reduce
income poverty. For this it suggests a “financing gap” of $54-62
billion each year. Second, it estimates the cost of meeting spe-
cific goals in health, education, and environment by using coun-
try-specific unit costs and then multiplying by the uncovered
population. Through this method they find that $35-75 billion
more per year is needed. Based on these two methods, this arti-
cle concludes that ODA increases in the range of $40-70 billion
are required. Again, this is an approximate doubling of official
aid flows, roughly confirming the Zedillo estimate. A series of
other papers have also tried to quantify the costs of meeting the
MDGs for particular regions, countries, or for meeting an indi-
vidual goal. Of note are the various estimates for costing uni-
versal primary education or Education for All (“EFA”), includ-
ing nine billion dollars per year15 and between ten and fifteen
billion dollars,16 respectively.
Most of these costing studies are careful to clarify that the
resulting estimates are imprecise and that several caveats apply
to their conclusions. The two most commonly cited assumptions,
and perhaps the most important, are: (1) the policy environment
within developing countries considerably improves; and (2) cur-
rent bottlenecks and capacity constraints are substantially
relieved. Regarding policies, the Zedillo study, for example,
assumes that recipients are doing “what’s necessary” to improve
policies. Similarly, Alain Mingat, Ramahatra Rakotomalala, and
Jee-Peng Tan, in looking at the costs associated with reaching
universal primary education for 33 African countries, state that
“the implicit assumption is that countries would reform their
education sector policies as needed to ensure that resources are
used to offer quality services in a cost-efficient manner.”17 The
Devarajan study also explicitly leaves aside the question of
developing countries’ capacity to spend aid effectively. 
Despite the careful qualifications included in many of these
studies, many in the policy, advocacy, and media world have
inappropriately focused attention on the bottom line figure: $50
billion more in aid is needed to achieve the MDGs. The misuse
and misinterpretation of the costing studies has added to the
impression that resources and aid flows are the critical or even
sole determinant of development outcomes. 
GOAL ONE: HALVING POVERTY
The first MDG is to halve the 1990 poverty headcount by
2015. On a global scale, this goal is very likely to be reached,
almost entirely because of poverty reduction in India and
China.18 At the same time, the majority of countries appear
unlikely to halve poverty by 2015. In addition, it is doubtful that
increased aid will sufficiently accelerate growth rates to meet
the poverty reduction target. Most of the costing studies use the
“financing gap” to calculate the additional aid required for
meeting growth targets, but this approach is problematic and
raises further doubts about the estimates. 
Economic growth is central to the poverty reduction goal
because it is the only source of increased income for the poor
that can be (comparatively) rapidly achieved. Poor people in
developing countries can become wealthier either through
receiving a greater share of existing national income (redistrib-
ution of wealth from rich to poor) or a similar share of a greater
national income (equitable economic growth). However, it is
historically very rare to see rapid changes in income inequality
(up or down) over time, and so those countries that have
achieved rapid and substantial poverty reduction have done so
mainly through economic growth.19 To achieve meaningful
poverty reduction, economic growth rates will have to acceler-
ate in the countries where the poor reside. 
The World Bank suggests that the typical African economy
will need to grow on average at least seven percent for the next
fifteen years in order to halve poverty rates.20 This compares to
an average regional growth rate of just 2.4 percent for the past
fifteen years. High rates of growth are unusual for Africa as well
as for the world as a whole. Between 1985 and 2000 only five
countries managed to sustain a seven percent growth average.21
Figure 1 reveals the stark contrast between UN goals and
performance in least developed countries (“LDC”) growth,
measured by the Penn World Table. The UN General Assembly
resolutions declaring the second and third “development
decades” —the 1970s and 1980s—gave explicit goals for aver-
age real annual growth in GDP and GDP per capita in develop-
ing countries: 3.5 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. In both
cases, population growth was assumed to be 2.5 percent per year. 
The UN declarations for the first and fourth “development
decades”—the 1960s and the 1990s—only give targets for GDP
growth, but we can approximate the implied GDP per capita
Figure 1: Hope springs eternal: Various growth goals
compared to growth performance.
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growth rate by assuming roughly the same rate of population
growth of 2.5 percent. This means that the First Development
Decade goal of five percent GDP growth implies roughly 2.5
percent in per capita growth, and likewise implies that the
Fourth Development Decade goal of seven percent in GDP
growth implies 4.5 percent in per capita GDP growth.
Comparing all of these targets to actual LDC performance in the
latter three decades of the twentieth century shows an arresting
pattern. Every decade or two since the 1960s, the UN has
increased its goal for developing country growth by one percent
while growth in LDCs has not changed much. This “goal infla-
tion” has, with the MDGs, arrived at the point where expecta-
tions of LDCs lie at the very extreme of the distribution.
Decades after the first round of goals, we still do not know how
to turn Zambia into Botswana, nor how to turn Laos into Korea. 
The expectation that unusually rapid growth rates might
now be achieved more widely is based on two assumptions: (1)
that policy changes will foster growth; and (2) that increased aid
in the presence of those good policies will catalyze faster
growth. There are problems with both of these assumptions,
however. Further caution is required regarding the link between
increased donor assistance and higher economic growth. This
assumption underlies all of the costing studies that use the
financing gap model for estimating how much aid will be need-
ed to reach certain growth targets. These estimates start from a
measurement of poverty-income elasticity and current growth
rates, which suggests a “growth gap”—the rate at which the
economy must grow to see the desired reduction in the poverty
headcount—or in the case of reaching the poverty MDG, to
halve the poverty ratio by 2015. This approach then uses the
incremental capital output ratio (“ICOR”) to calculate the level
of investment required to reach the growth levels, and then sub-
tracts domestic savings to get the external financing gap—or the
amount of required aid. The problem is that, in practice, the
financing gap model does not appear to work.22 As one exam-
ple, William Easterly demonstrates in a 1999 study that had the
financing gap approach worked as expected over the period
1960-1994, Zambia’s per capita income would have been
$20,000, or 33 times the actual figure of about $600.23
One recent and more positive contribution to the aid and
growth literature is the work of Craig Burnside and David
Dollar.24 This highly influential study has been used to make the
case that aid can lead to growth under the right circumstances—
including the policy environment assumed by many of the cost-
ing studies. The results of the Burnside and Dollar study appear
to be somewhat fragile—the results tend to weaken when
changing the time period, adding new country data, or altering
the definitions of “aid” or “good policies.”25 Robert Cassen’s
conclusion some ten years ago still seems to hold: 
Inter-country statistical analyses do not show anything
conclusive—positive or negative—about the impact of
aid on growth. Given the enormous variety of countries
and types of aid this is not surprising.... If such a rela-
tionship does not emerge overall, it only shows the unex-
citing conclusion that aid may or may not be strongly
related to growth, depending on circumstances.26
More recently, Michael Clemens, Steve Radelet, and Rikhil
Bhavnani have found striking evidence of a positive average
effect of development aid on growth, once the type of aid ana-
lyzed is matched to the time horizon of its expected growth
effect.27 While this effect is clear on average, it varies greatly by
country and its magnitude is limited to a certain range—two rea-
sons to question whether even unlimited aid could cause a par-
ticular high level of growth in any given country. 
It seems plausible to assume that the relationship between aid
and growth in the presence of good policies holds, at least under
some circumstances. Does this suggest that significant increases in
aid are likely to help meet the poverty MDG? The answer is still
uncertain. This is because most low-income countries with high
levels of poverty either have poor policies and weak institutions
(and thus are assumed to be unable to use additional aid effective-
ly) or already receive considerable amounts of external assistance.
This second factor may be a problem, because even work that
accepts a link between aid and growth finds that, above a certain
level of aid, the relationship begins to break down.28 Many poor
countries thought to have “good policies” already receive substan-
tial aid. Many top-performing countries—such as Ghana,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras, Burkina Faso, and
Tanzania—receive aid flows well above ten percent of GDP. Were
total ODA levels to be doubled, as called for in the costing studies,
the countries that are perhaps best able to absorb large aid increas-
es are India and China, which currently receive minimal aid (0.36
percent and 0.13 percent of GDP, respectively). However, these
two countries are both considered “on track.”29 The MDGs do not
change the oft-noted irony of aid: those that need it most are fre-
quently the ones least able to use it effectively.
REACHING THE SOCIAL SECTOR GOALS
We turn now to the social sector MDGs. There is already a
large literature on the complex relationships between condi-
tions, interventions, and outcomes, but this appears to have been
somewhat neglected in public discussion of the MDGs. For
example, most health or education variables are quite closely
related to income.30 However, studies have shown that over
time, progress on these indicators is not correlated with the rate
of growth in that country.31 Given this, it may be difficult to
considerably accelerate progress through policy changes or
alteration in resources. 
Adding to the complexity of the causal chain between
expenditures and outcomes is the fact that certain sector inter-
ventions can have impacts on other sector outcomes. Michael
Kremer and Edward Miguel, for instance, found that de-worm-
ing programs had a strongly positive impact on school atten-
dance in Kenya.32 Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart, who
found that health expenditures appeared to have little or no
impact on life expectancy, suggest that increased female pri-
mary enrollment did.33
All of this suggests that: (1) additional aid may not be the
most important factor in improving social outcomes; (2) sectoral
distribution of aid to maximize progress on any particular social
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MDG is not clear; (3) unit-cost approaches utilized in costing
studies may be dramatically misleading; and (4) “best practices”
may not be easily exportable because they are dependent on a
range of determining factors that may be difficult to replicate.
Of course, some of the costing study authors have suggested
such problems themselves, but this has not stopped the wide-
spread misinterpretation of their work. To better illustrate these
arguments and the weaknesses in the costing approach to the
MDGs, we turn now to the specific social sector goals and the
historical record, focusing mainly on the second MDG of
achieving universal primary education and, briefly, touching on
the other goals. 
GOALS TWO AND THREE: UNIVERSAL
COMPLETION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AND GENDER
EQUALITY IN EDUCATION
Over the decades, rates of primary enrollment and comple-
tion have risen nearly everywhere—even in many of the very
poorest countries—and they have risen at remarkably uniform
rates. Figure 2 gives an overview of what happened to enroll-
ments between 1960 and 2000. The figure answers the follow-
ing question: If we were to make the assumption that the growth
of primary enrollment across time in all countries fol-
lowed the same pattern, based on one particular S-
shaped curve (or “logistic” curve), what would that
curve look like? The figure takes the path that each
country followed during those four decades, and lines
up each country individually so that, if following that
single curve, it would have hit the fifty percent enroll-
ment mark in the same year, that is, “adjusted year”
zero.
Two things jump out from the graph. First, our
assumption is not that bad; countries’ idiosyncratic
paths from low to high enrollment cluster remarkably
closely around a single S-curve, whose slope at the
halfway mark (or “transition speed”) is about 0.04.
There is variation around the curve, but remarkably lit-
tle given that the countries there include tropical and arctic, rich
and poor, socialist and capitalist, war-torn and peaceful. Second,
the slope of the curve, or the “typical” transition speed from low
to high enrollment, is low compared to growth rates required to
meet the MDG target. While the extension of mass schooling in
the latter half of the twentieth century was vast, it also took a
long time. If it started at fifty percent enrollment, the typical
country, whether rich or poor, would have risen to 70 percent
after 22.3 years, 80 percent after 36.4 years, and 90 percent after
57.7 years. 
Figure 3 shows that for the 90 countries for which we have
data—representing a very broad range of wealth and institution-
al, political, and geographic conditions—no country has a tran-
sition speed above 0.13, the rate required to increase enrollment
from 80 percent to 95 percent over a fifteen year period. There
are 38 countries in this data set that have 2000 enrollment rates
below 80 percent. For these countries, and others for which we
do not have data, reaching 95 percent enrollment by 2015 (still
short of the MDG target) will require historically unprecedent-
ed rates of progress. 
It appears unlikely that many countries will even manage to
approach the 0.13 transition rate. One reason for, or at least a
related phenomenon to, the strong historical determinism of pri-
mary enrollment growth rates is the strong relationship between
parental primary completion and child enrollment. This correlates
with more than ten times the amount of cross-country variation in
transition speeds than does education spending. This suggests a
significant “demand side” element to primary education, with
wealthier, educated parents far more willing to send their children
to school. Deon Filmer estimates that even if all rural people in a
sample of 22 countries lived right next door to a school, enroll-
ment rates would only increase from an average of 49.8 percent
to 53.1 percent—suggesting the dominance of “demand-side con-
straints.”34 Across countries, there is no significant relationship
between public spending per child on education and the primary
school completion rate, once income is controlled for.35
Given that education expenditures do not appear to be a par-
ticularly strong historical determinant of enrollment, that not all
countries will grow rapidly, and that it is very hard, in a fifteen
year period, to dramatically increase parental primary completion
rates, it is unlikely that many countries will achieve high transi-
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tion speeds. Indeed, even most “exceptions to the rule” or “best
practices” of rapid increases are, sadly, related to unique circum-
stances, considerable reductions in quality, or questionable data.36
Turning to gender equality in education, Figure 4 shows the
path taken by the female-to-male ratio in gross primary enroll-
ments for all 168 countries in the UNESCO database since
1950. The figure is constructed in a manner identical to that of
Figure 2. Once again we see that the assumption that all coun-
tries follow the same S-shaped path to gender parity is not strict-
ly true, but neither is it far from the mark. The typical country
has taken a long time to reach gender parity in primary school
enrollment. The shape of the curve in Figure 4 suggests, for
example, that a country whose ratio of girls’ gross primary
enrollment to boys’ is 0.8 typically takes 28 years to reach a
ratio of 0.95. In 2000, seventeen countries had a ratio of less
than 0.8. Nevertheless, the great majority of developing coun-
tries are already fairly close to meeting the MDG target of gen-
der equality in education.37 A substantial majority of countries
will likely reach this particular goal by 2015. The use of static
unit costs in education estimates, as used in the costing studies,
is therefore likely to ignore perhaps the most important deter-
minants of enrollment. 
GOAL FOUR: REDUCING CHILD MORTALITY BY
TWO-THIRDS
In the fourth MDG, governments have committed them-
selves to reducing child mortality by two-thirds between 1990
and 2015. Assume (as we did with the education goals) that
every country follows the exact same S-curve, in this case
towards zero infant mortality, but (again) that each country goes
through this transition at a different time. 
These assumptions once more appear reasonably robust.
Figure 5 shows what happens if we take data for 35 rich and
poor countries covering roughly the twentieth century, assume
that the historically highest level of infant mortality was 350
infant deaths per 10,000 live births, and then horizontally align
all the series so that every country passes through fifty percent
of the maximum—that is, 175—in the same year (“adjusted
year” zero). The lessons are familiar from the previous two sec-
tions. Immediately we see that: (1) there is remarkably little
diversity in the rate at which this has occurred; and (2) the typ-
ical experience of a country in the twentieth century was that
this transition was slow as compared to the MDG target decline.
The slope of the S-curve running through the middle of the
cloud, representing the experience of the “typical” country
among these 35, is –0.0339 at the inflection point. That means
that a country typical of this group, if it started out at one hun-
dred infant deaths per ten thousand live births, would take 40
years to decrease this level by two-thirds. This figure is rela-
tively insensitive to the starting level. 
Nor has the story dramatically changed in the late twentieth
century, despite technology and economic advances. Although
such advances allowed for far lower infant mortality rates essen-
tially everywhere, the speed at which countries made the transi-
tion from high to low infant mortality did not change significant-
ly. We will now restrict the sample to the years 1980-2000, and
consider all 176 countries for which the World Development
Indicators provide data. The S-curve will show that a typical
country in this group, starting from an infant mortality of one hun-
dred, would take 42 years to lower this figure by two-thirds.38
This suggests that the forces that primarily determine the
speed of this transition go beyond public health policy and
inputs—a conclusion supported by a number of different stud-
ies. It appears that one of the reasons that interventions often do
not have the desired outcome is, as Lant Pritchett showed with
the relative ineffectiveness of family planning aid,39 that supply-
side responses do not address the demand components that are
affected by broader social and economic changes. Income
inequality, literacy, ethnic composition, and religion are all fac-
tors slow to change, at least within a fifteen-year perspective. 
None of this is to say that specific public health interven-
tions and large injections of inputs purchased by aid cannot
FALL 2005 
Figure 4: Uniformity in the increase in female-to-male













Figure 5: The course of Infant mortality in 35 countries
over roughly the 20th century
Infant mortality is deaths before age one per 10,000 live births. Data are
quinquennial and aligned horizontally assuming that all pass through fifty
percent of a maximum value of 350 in “adjusted year” zero.
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affect infant mortality; obviously they can. Lucia Hanmer,
Robert Lensick, and Howard White suggest that while income
per capita, education, and gender inequality are all robust deter-
minants in explaining infant and child mortality across countries
at a single time, some health spending (particularly on immu-
nization programs) can also have a significant impact.40 Rather,
the question is whether the rapid increase in the mortality tran-
sition rate needed to meet the fourth MDG is accessible to even
the wisest and best-funded policy interventions. 
LEAPS FORWARD?
It is not that we cannot imagine a scenario where histori-
cally unprecedented progress is made towards the MDGs. If
effective preventative and treatment interventions available for
preventing childhood mortality became ubiquitous, the number
of under-age-five deaths worldwide might fall by as much as 63
percent. For instance, one recent cross-country analysis suggests
that, in countries with good governance, additional health
spending and aid financing can have an impact on health out-
comes.41 Yet this same study suggests how difficult it would be
to meet the health MDGs in Africa, and why the MDGs at their
current levels are over-reaching. First, the average quality of
African government institutions, as measured by the World
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, would
have to leapfrog to one standard deviation above the mean glob-
al score (from significantly below the average today). Then gov-
ernment health expenditures as a percentage of GDP would have
to reach as much as 16.5 percent – an implausible level greater
than that spent by any country in the world. 
It may be that progress in meeting some of the other MDGs—
perhaps in halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, reversing the inci-
dence of malaria, and halving the proportion of people without
sustainable access to drinking water and sanitation—could in fact
be rapid enough to meet the MDG timetable. This appears possi-
ble because a small number of technological advances, or a signif-
icant increase in investment in a particular infrastructure, could
have a major effect on these areas in ways not obvious in the other
goals. The creation of a malaria vaccine, for example, would have
a monumental impact toward meeting the sixth MDG,42 but it is
difficult to imagine a similar single technological advance that
would significantly impact education outcomes. 
MAKING THE PERFECT ENEMY OF THE GOOD
Growing concern that the MDGs will not be achieved
should not obscure the bigger picture: development progress
in terms of social indicators has been occurring at unprece-
dented levels throughout the great majority of the world’s
population over the past thirty or more years. For example,
the divergence in life expectancies between rich and poor
countries, which had been occurring since perhaps as early as
the fifteenth century, has been dramatically reversed in the
second half of the last century. Between 1950 and 1999, the
population-weighted average life expectancy has risen from
51 to 69 years while the population-weighted standard devia-
tion has fallen from thirteen to seven years.43 Data on infant
survival suggests a similar performance. In the second half of
the twentieth century, average global literacy increased from
52 percent to 81 percent, while the weighted standard devia-
tion dropped from 38 percent to seventeen percent. Turning to
female literacy as a percentage of male literacy, over the
1970-2000 period, the global average ratio has improved from
59 percent to 80 percent. This reflects a dramatic long-term
improvement in social indicators even for countries that have
seen limited economic growth. For example, average life
expectancy for countries at $300 GDP per capita in 1999 is
slightly higher than that for countries with a GDP per capita
of $3,000 in 1870 (in constant dollars). In other words, it now
takes only one tenth the income to achieve the same life
expectancy as it did 130 years ago.44
It is hard to view this progress as anything other than a dra-
matic success. Even if divergence continues “big time” with
regard to income,45 other quality of life indicators suggest his-
torically unprecedented improvement. There are, of course, sig-
nificant clouds on the horizon—the AIDS pandemic is having a
particularly dramatic impact in Sub-Saharan Africa, where life
expectancy in the region as a whole has declined in recent years,
and is likely to level off only in 2010.46 Nonetheless, it is not
clear why we should expect progress to halt more broadly. 
A continuation of the progress that has characterized the typ-
ical developing country of the last fifty years will, by and large,
leave countries missing the MDGs in 2015, yet still outperform-
ing the historical trajectories of now-developed countries. In
Figure 6, for example, we see the trajectory of primary school
enrollment for Burkina Faso. The country is on a trend well
above the typical country since 1960 and even further ahead of
the typical rich-country transition in the nineteenth century. (The
same statement is true of Mali, Senegal, Madagascar, and
Nicaragua, among others.) Surely this is not unambitious per-
formance. Despite this success, however, Burkina Faso will fail
to meet the MDG target. It is perhaps worth asking whether the
success or the target should be questioned. 
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Figure 6: Many countries unlikely to meet the MDG for














MOVING FORWARD: RE-INTERPRETING THE MDGS
There is a long history of international goal setting for devel-
opment. For instance, a steady succession of international confer-
ences since the 1940s has declared universal primary education
achievable within a short-time period and pledged to make the
necessary investments to do so.47 Nevertheless, countries all over
the world continue to undergo the slow adjustments of their soci-
eties and economies that have allowed more children to go to
school. But in setting unrealistic goals and claiming they can in
fact be universally met, the MDGs may run the risk of creating a
climate of inaccurate pessimism about both development and aid. 
THE MDGS AS REAL TARGETS
The MDGs can be understood in two ways. One interpreta-
tion is to take the specific goals literally, accept them as the real
targets of the development community, and take the costing
study estimates as reflective of the amount of aid needed to
reach those goals. This view sees the MDGs as an important
mechanism for raising aid flows and ensuring accountability for
donor promises. This literal interpretation of the MDGs and
misreading of the costing studies can lead to the belief that huge
aid flows can quickly produce epochal change in an array of
development indicators across broad regions. Perhaps such out-
comes will be achieved, particularly regarding the goals in areas
such as water and sanitation, but, as we have seen, the historical
evidence suggests it is unlikely that the majority of goals will be
reached by the majority of countries.
The determinants of the outcomes embodied by the MDGs
are in fact complex. Time itself clearly is an important factor but
is not accounted for by universal time-bound goals. Many of the
available interventions in terms of policy reforms or increases in
resources are supply-side responses. These interventions do lit-
tle to increase demand, which is linked to longer-term social and
economic changes. This does not mean that poor people do not
desire better standards of living; rather the range of incentives
faced by many poor people lead them to make choices that
might contradict the outcomes represented in the MDGs. This is
one reason why outcomes seem to change only slowly, and also
suggests that there may be a limited potential role for aid in
meeting extremely ambitious, universal, time-bound goals. This
does not claim in any sense that aid is unimportant or ineffec-
tive, but only that aid cannot by itself deliver the MDGs. 
THE MDGS AS A SYMBOL
A second understanding of the MDGs is a more nuanced
view—that the goals are a symbol of the kinds of outcomes
toward which the development community should strive.
Similarly, new aid flows are considered just one of several neces-
sary conditions for progress on development indicators. This sec-
ond interpretation makes the MDGs a tool rather than a practical
target. Goals generate discussion, focus attention, and help assign
accountability for leaders’ pledges. There can be little doubt that
the MDGs helped galvanize the aid community and reverse the
aid declines after the end of the Cold War. The United States, the
European Union, Canada, Norway, and others made promises of
substantial aid increases at Monterrey in 2002, a result doubtless-
ly influenced by the MDG negotiations two years earlier. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THESE INTERPRETATIONS
In spite of the notable benefits of the MDGs, even when
taken as symbolic rather than literal, there has been almost no
discussion so far of potential costs of the specific form taken by
these goals. These potential costs take two distinct forms: unrea-
sonable expectations about what is likely to be achieved within
a short time period, and unreasonable expectations about the
role of aid in the development process. 
The specific targets of the MDGs have set up many coun-
tries for unavoidable “failure.” Some governments pursuing
wise policies and historically encouraging progress on develop-
ment indicators could be weakened or de-legitimized by the
label of “failure” in 2015. The MDGs confuse interpretation of
their performance with universal, time-bound targets that for
many countries are, in practice, impossible to reach. Costing
studies, by positing that such goals are attainable and asking
merely for the resource inputs, contribute to the illusion that the
goals are attainable for all countries. Even if most development
practitioners know this is not true, they must recognize that the
expectations of many have been raised. 
Another potential downside is the possibility for adding to
donor fatigue and distracting recipient countries from much-
needed domestic reforms. If donors provide additional tens of
billions of dollars in aid per year sometime in the next few
years, and if subsequently many of the goals are still not met,
this will provide ammunition to interest groups in rich coun-
tries seeking to give up on development assistance. Developing
countries will undoubtedly need many decades of sustained
assistance—as Korea, Botswana, and other eventual successes
have received—and this must not be interrupted by declara-
tions of failure in 2015. However, if the increase in aid does not
materialize, a failure to reach the MDGs may help legitimize
leaders in the developing world who pursue policies that are
anathema to economic growth. “What else could we do,” they
will ask, “when the rich countries broke their promises?” The
ensuing finger pointing could also undermine constituencies
throughout the developing world for necessarily slow but
essential reforms toward transparency, accountability, rule of
law, and meritocracy. 
CONCLUSION
Moving forward, the donor community should accept that it
is not feasible for the majority of countries to reach the majori-
ty of the MDGs. Similarly, the costing studies should not be
invoked as evidence that we can simply purchase outcomes with
more assistance. The studies themselves make no such claims,
and history shows this is highly unlikely to be true. Instead, the
MDGs should be presented as useful benchmarks that publicly
bring out the stark contrast between the world we want and the
world we have, and cause us to redouble our search for points of
intervention to close the gap. 
The donor community might also consider ways of insti-
tutionalizing the recognition of development success. The
government of Burkina Faso, for example, should be support-
ed and lauded by the international community for raising
school enrollments much faster than most poor and now-rich
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countries did in the past, rather than criticized and delegit-
imized because primary enrollment is less than fifty percent.
Country-specific benchmarks can help signal when interven-
tions of some kind are necessary, and they can also provide
markers for progress along the way, given a country’s cir-
cumstances. Instead of focusing time and energy on compil-
ing lists of “off-track” countries, effort should be spent on
compiling lists of countries that are “on-track” or better after
taking account of their particular circumstances and historical
trends. Some kind of institutionalized response by the inter-
national community would thus redefine Burkina Faso as the
educational success it has been. This would not in any way
endorse the fact that half of Burkinabe children still do not
enroll in school, nor imply in any way that schooling is not
their right. It would, however, bring important international
pressure to bear in support of those who for decades have
been working to get Burkinabe children into school at a rate
faster than many far richer countries have managed. 
Lastly, future international development goals might avoid
some of these pitfalls. The next round of goals should: (1) be
country-specific and flexible, more like today’s International
Development Association targets; (2) take historical perform-
ance into account; (3) focus more on intermediate targets than
outcomes; and (4) be considered benchmarks to spur action in
cases where assistance is not working, rather than technically
feasible goals. 
This last point is worth emphasizing: it is useful to know
that a country is raising school enrollments more slowly than the
historically typical rate. It can give political support to con-
stituencies in that country seeking changes in national policies,
spur donors to intervene, and support change through financial
and other means. But this is much different from the effects of
declaring that it is feasible for a country to raise enrollments at
five times the historically typical rates. Country-specific bench-
marks carry the benefits of goal setting without the potential
downsides of universal goals. This suggests that goal setting at
the global level should be bottom-up rather than top-down—that
is, the world targets should start from country goals and then
aggregate up, rather than setting global goals and then estimat-
ing what countries would need to do to achieve them. 
Indeed, for the next round of goals, the donor community
might consider avoiding global-level costing studies, especially
for outcomes known to be only tenuously linked to financial
inputs. Rough back-of the-envelope estimates can potentially be
useful for identifying the hypothetical scale of resources and
also for some limited supply-side interventions. Yet the wide-
spread misinterpretation of the studies suggests that, however
narrowly conceived by the authors, misuse appears difficult to
avoid. A more direct approach might be to advocate cost-specif-
ic interventions and link them to intermediate indicators rather
than outcomes; for example, costing an immunization program
rather than child mortality. Calculating financing gaps and unit
costs for final outcomes appear to merely create more illusion
than illumination. 
It is worth stressing the caveats attached to our analysis.
None of this is to argue against aid or that goal setting is per se
counterproductive. Aid has clearly been an important part of
developmental progress for many countries. Perhaps aid levels
should increase by $50 billion, but not with the expectation that
this will cause the MDGs to be met. Similarly, goals should
indeed be set to enhance accountability and allocational effi-
ciency, but goals must take history and context into account or
potentially risk malign irrelevance. 
Perhaps most significantly, we have based most of our
argument on historical precedent. History can be a fickle guide
to the future. To take two recent development trends as an
example, the spread of the Internet has been more rapid than
the spread of the mobile phone, which was in turn more rapid
than the television, which was in turn more rapid than the fixed
telephone. And the spread of democratic institutions in devel-
oping countries over the past fifteen years would have been
poorly predicted based on a trend of declining democratic free-
doms over the thirty years previously. It may be (and we hope
it is) the case that policies will improve, that the environment
for the effective utilization of aid becomes friendlier, and that
technology and policy trends combine to allow historically
unprecedented levels of progress across the broad range of
development that is encompassed by the MDGs. Even if that is
not the case, many countries will reach at least some of the
MDG targets. More importantly, it is quite probable that the
significant rate of improvement that we are already seeing in
developing countries will continue in the next fifteen years,
enhancing the lives of billions worldwide.
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